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Abstract
A birthday surprise is the event that, given k uniformly random samples from a sample space
of size n, at least two of them are identical. We show that Bernoulli numbers can be used to
derive arbitrarily exact bounds on the probability of a birthday surprise. This result can be used
in arbitrary precision calculators, and it can be applied to better understand some questions in
communication security and pseudorandom number generation.
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1. Introduction
In this note we address the probability kn that in a sample of k uniformly random
elements out of a space of size n there exist at least two identical elements. This
problem has a long history and a wide range of applications. The term birthday surprise
for a collision of (at least) two elements in the sample comes from the case n= 365,
where the problem can be stated as follows: Assuming that the birthday of people
distributes uniformly over the year, what is the probability that in a class of k students,
at least two have the same birthday?
It is clear (and well known) that the expected number of collisions (or birthdays)
in a sample of k out of n is(
k
2
)
1
n
=
k(k − 1)
2n
:
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(Indeed, for each distinct i and j in the range {1; : : : ; k}, let Xij be the random variable
taking the value 1 if samples i and j obtained the same value and 0 otherwise. Then
the expected number of collisions is E(
∑
i =j Xij) =
∑
i =j E(Xij) =
∑
i =j
1
n = (
k
2 )
1
n .)
Thus, 28 students are enough to make the expected number of common birthdays
greater than 1. This seemingly surprising phenomenon has got the name birthday sur-
prise, or birthday paradox.
In several applications, it is desirable to have exact bounds on the probability of a
collision. For example, if some electronic application chooses pseudorandom numbers
as passwords for its users, it may be a bad surprise if two users get the same password
by coincidence. It is this term “by coincidence” that we wish to make precise.
2. Bounding the probability of a birthday surprise
When k and n are relatively small, it is a manner of simple calculation to determine
kn . The probability that all samples are distinct is

kn =
(
1− 1
n
)(
1− 2
n
)
· · ·
(
1− k − 1
n
)
(1)
and kn = 1− 
kn. For example, one can check directly that 23365¿ 12 , i.e., in a class of
23 students the probability that two share the same birthday is greater than 12 . This is
another variant of the Birthday surprise. 1
The calculation becomes problematic when k and n are large, both due to precision
problems and computational complexity (in cryptographic applications k may be of
the order of trillions, i.e., thousands of billions). This problem can be overcome by
considering the logarithm of the product:
ln (
kn) =
k−1∑
i=1
ln
(
1− i
n
)
:
Since each i is smaller than n, we can use the Taylor expansion ln(1−x)=−∑∞m=1 xm=m
(|x|¡ 1) to get that
− ln(
kn) =
k−1∑
i=1
∞∑
m=1
(i=n)m
m
=
∞∑
m=1
1
mnm
k−1∑
i=1
im: (2)
(Changing the order of summation is possible because the sums involve positive coef-
Dcients.)
The coeEcients p(k − 1; m):=∑k−1i=1 im (which are often called sums of powers, or
simply power sums) play a key role in our estimation of the birthday probability.
1 To experience this phenomenon experimentally, the reader is referred to [8].
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EEcient calculations of the Drst few power sums go back to ancient mathematics. 2 In
particular, we have: p(k; 1)= k(k+1)=2, and p(k; 2)= k(k+1)(2k+1)=6. Higher-order
power sums can be found recursively using Bernoulli numbers.
The Bernoulli numbers (which are indexed by superscripts) 1=B0, B1, B2, B3, B4; : : :
are deDned by the formal equation “Bn = (B − 1)n” for n¿ 1, where the quotation
marks indicate that the involved terms are to be expanded in formal powers of B
before interpreting. Thus
• B2 = B2 − 2B1 + 1, whence B1 = 12 ,
• B3 = B3 − 3B2 + 3B1 − 1, whence B2 = 16 ,
etc. We thus get that B3 = 0; B4 =− 130 , B5 = 0, B6 = 142 , B7 = 0, and so on. It follows
that for each m,
p(k; m) =
“(k + B)m+1 − Bm+1”
m+ 1
(Faulhaber’s formula [6]) Thus, the coeEcients p(k; m) can be eEciently calculated
for small values of m. In particular, we get that
• p(k; 3) = 14k4 + 12k3 + 14k2,
• p(k; 4) = 15k5 + 12k4 + 13k3 − 130k,
• p(k; 5) = 16k6 + 12k5 + 512k4 − 112k2,
• p(k; 6) = 17k7 + 12k6 + 12k5 − 16k3 + 142k,
• p(k; 7) = 18k8 + 12k7 + 712k6 − 724k4 + 112k2,
etc. In order to show that this is enough, we need to bound the tail of the series in
Eq. (2). We will achieve this by eJectively bounding the power sums.
Lemma 1. Let k be any natural number; and assume that f : (0; k) → R+ is such
that f′′(x) exists; and is nonnegative for all x∈ (0; k). Then
k∑
i=1
f(i)¡
∫ k
0
f(x + 12) dx:
Proof. For each interval [i; i+1] (i=0; : : : ; k−1); the tangent to the graph of f(x+ 12)
at x= i+ 12 goes below the graph of f(x+
1
2). This implies that the area of the added
part is greater than that of the uncovered part.
Using Lemma 1, we have that for all m¿ 1,
k−1∑
i=1
im ¡
∫ k−1
0
(x + 12)
m dx¡
(k − 1=2)m+1
m+ 1
:
2 Archimedes (ca. 287-212 BCE) provided a geometrical derivation of a “formula” for the sum of squares
[9].
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Thus,
∞∑
m=N
p(k − 1; m)
mnm
¡
∞∑
m=N
(k − 1=2)m+1
m(m+ 1)nm
¡
k − 1=2
N (N + 1)
∞∑
m=N
(
k − 1=2
n
)m
=
k − 12
N (N + 1)
((k − 1=2)=n)N
1− (k − 1=2)=n
=
(k − 1=2)N+1
N (N + 1)(1− (k − 1=2)=n)nN : (3)
We thus have the following.
Theorem 2. Let 
kn denote the probability that all elements in a sample of k elements
out of n are distinct. For a natural number N; de7ne
kn(N ):=
(k − 1=2)N+1
N (N + 1)(1− (k − 1=2)=n)nN :
Then
N−1∑
m=1
p(k − 1; m)
mnm
¡− ln (
kn)¡
N−1∑
m=1
p(k − 1; m)
mnm
+ kn(N ):
For example, for N = 2 we get
(k − 1)k
2n
¡− ln (
kn)¡
(k − 1)k
2n
+
(k − 1=2)3
6n2(1− (k − 1=2)=n) :
We demonstrate the tightness of these bounds with a few concrete examples:
Example 3. Let us bound the probability that in a class of Dve students there ex-
ist two sharing the same birthday. Using Theorem 2 with N = 2 we get by sim-
ple calculation that 273 ¡ − ln(
5365)¡ 273 + 2432105320 ; or numerically; 3 0:0273972¡ −
ln(
5365)¡ 0:0275127. Thus, 0:0270253¡
5
365¡ 0:0271377. Repeating the calculations
with N=3 yields 0:0271349¡5365¡ 0:0271356. N=4 shows that 
5
365=0:0271355 : : : .
Example 4. We bound the probability that in a class of 73 students there exist two shar-
ing the same birthday; using N=2: 365 ¡−ln(
73365)¡ 365 +121945255792 ; and numerically we get
that 0:9992534¡73365¡ 0:9995882. For N =3 we get 0:9995365¡
73
365¡ 0:9995631;
and for N = 8 we get that 73365 = 0:9995608 : : : .
In Theorem 2, kn(N ) converges to 0 exponentially fast with N . In fact, the upper
bound is a very good approximation to the actual probability, as can be seen in the
3 All calculations in this paper were performed using the GNU bc calculator [5], with a scale of 500
digits.
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above examples. The reason for this is the eJectiveness of the bound in Lemma 1 (see
[4] for an analysis of this bound as an approximation).
For k ¡
√
n, we can bound kn directly: Note that for |x|¡ 1 and odd M ,
∑M
m=0
(−x)m=m!¡ e−x ¡∑M+1m=0 (−x)m=m!.
Corollary 5. Let kn denote the probability of a birthday surprise in a sample of k
out of n; and let lN (k; n) and uN (k; n) be the lower and upper bounds from Theorem
2; respectively. Then for all odd M;
−
M+1∑
m=1
(−lN (k; n))m
m!
¡kn ¡−
M∑
m=1
(−uN (k; n))m
m!
:
For example, when M = 1 we get that
(k − 1)k
2n
− (k − 1)
2k2
4n2
¡kn ¡
(k − 1)k
2n
+
(k − 1=2)3
6n2(1− (k − 1=2)=n) : (4)
The explicit bounds become more complicated when M ¿ 1, but once the lower and
upper bounds in Theorem 2 are computed numerically, bounding kn using Corollary 5
is easy. However, Corollary 5 is not really needed in order to deduce the bounds—these
can be calculated directly from the bounds of Theorem 2, e.g., using the exponential
function built in calculators.
Remark 6.
(1) It can be proved directly that in fact kn ¡ (k − 1)k=2n [2]. However; it is not
clear how to extend the direct argument to get tighter bounds in a straightforward
manner.
(2) Our lower bound in Eq. (4) compares favorably with the lower bound (1 −
1=e)((k − 1)k)=2n from [3] when k6√2n=e (when k ¿√2n=e we need to take
larger values of M to get a better approximation).
(3) p(k − 1; m) is bounded from below by (k − 1)m+1=(m+ 1). This implies a slight
improvement on Theorem 2.
3. Some applications
3.1. Arbitrary percision calculators
Arbitrary percision calculators do calculations to any desired level of accuracy.
Well-known examples are the bc and GNU bc [5] calculators. Theorem 2 allows cal-
culating kn to any desired level of accuracy (in this case, the parameter N will be
determined by the required level of accuracy), and in practical time. An example of
such calculation appears below (Example 7).
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3.2. Cryptography
The probability of a birthday surprise plays an important role in the security analysis
of various cryptographic systems. For this purpose, it is common to use the approxi-
mation kn ≈ k2=2n. However, in concrete security analysis it is preferred to have exact
bounds rather than estimations (see [1] and references therein).
The second item of Remark 6 implies that security bounds derived using earlier
methods are tighter than previously thought. The following example demonstrates the
tightness of the bounds of Theorem 2 for these purposes.
Example 7. In [2]; 2
32
2128 is estimated approximately. Using Theorem 2 with N =2; we
get that in fact;
2−65:0000000003359036150250796039103¡2
32
2128 ¡ 2
−65:0000000003359036150250796039042:
With N = 3 we get that 2
32
2128 lies between
2−65:000000000335903615025079603904203942942489665995829764250752
and
2−65:000000000335903615025079603904203942942489665995829764250713:
The remarkable tightness of these bounds is due to the fact that 232 is much smaller
than 2128.
Another application of our results is for estimations of the quality of approximations
such as ( nk ) ≈ nk=k! (when kn):
Fact 8. ( nk ) = (n
k=k!)
kn.
Thus the quality of this approximation is directly related to the quality of the approx-
imation 
kn ≈ 1, which is well understood via Theorem 2.

kn appears in many other natural contexts. For example, assume that a function
f : {0; : : : ; n − 1} → {0; : : : ; n − 1} is chosen with uniform probability from the set of
all such functions, and Dx an element x∈{0; : : : ; n− 1}. Then we have the following
immediate observation.
Fact 9. The probability that the orbit of x under f has size exactly k is 
knk=n. The
probability that the size of the orbit of x is larger than k is simply 
kn.
These probabilities play an important role in the theory of iterative pseudorandom
number generation (see [10] for a typical example).
4. Final remarks and acknowledgments
For a nice account of power sums see [7]. An accessible presentation and proof of
Faulhaber’s formula appears in [6]. The author thanks John H. Conway for the nice
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